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It is a widely accepted principle in both theology ami the human sciences that the self, though
each person perceives him- or herself as a singularity, is also characterized by multiplicity. The
author analyzes this apparent paradox as it appears in contemporary social cognitive psychology
and in Christian theological models of the person that are grounded in the doctrine of imago Dei.
He argues that, whereas there are evident differences in the psychological and theological concep-
tions of the nature ofpersons, both disciplines endorse concepts ofpersonhood that are character-
ized by a dynamic process of self-unification. Thus, the conceptual divide alleged to exist between
theological and secular scientific models of the person may not be as pronounced as numy suppose.
introduction
A paradox lies at the heart of this essay.
Although persons perceive themselves to be
whole, seemingly unified, continuous
singularities, both contemporary psychology
and Christian theology seem to accept that
what has come to be refeired to as the self is,
at best, multifaceted and, at worst, fragmented.
As with so many issues relating to the study
of the human self, it is a paradox with an an-
cient pedigree. Allusions to the multiplicity
of the person are readily identifiable in his-
torical and contemporary philosophy and the-
ology and are especially prominent in twenti-
eth-centur>' psychology.
It is commonly supposed that theological
conceptions of the self are at odds with scien-
tific conceptions. In mainstream secular psy-
chological science, at least, contemporary
metaphors for mind and self have largely re-
placed traditional concepts inspired by Chris-
tian theology. Evocative terms such as '"soul,"'
"spirit." and "essence" have given way to a
mundanely anatomical language that frames
the modem cognitive, self against the back-
ground of "memory stores." "modality-spe-
cific mental modules." and "patterns of dis-
tributed neuronal activation." Less pointed,
even, than the "id" and "ego" of Freudian psy-
choanalysis, these have proved to be im-
mensely important concepts that have yielded
a great deal of insight into the functioning of
the individual, but seem far removed from
everyday experience. The conceptual speci-
ficity and value-neutrality that is. purportedly,
inherent in modern psychology is a welcome
development in the search for a fuller under-
standing of the real inner person; but there is
still, arguably, a need for theories that cap-
ture the elusive not-readily-quantifiable as-
pects of the sense of self as it is actually ex-
perienced. It is just these facets of the person
that have been elaborately described in the
writings of countless philosophers and theo-
logians; and, though these are often portrayed
as outdated, overly value-laden or irrelevant
to current psychological theorizing, psycholo-
gists should not dismiss this body of theories
too quickly.
It is not just psychology and the secular
philosophy of mind that has overlooked the
importance of a dialogue with theology. Or-
thodox Christian theologian John Zizioulas
notes:
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The attempt to supplant Christianity in
whatever concerns the dignity of man
has succeeded in detaching the concept
of the person from theology and uniting
it with the idea of an autonomous
morality or with an existential philo-
sophy which is purely humanistic.
Thus, although the person and "per-
sonal identity" are widely discussed
nowadays as a supreme ideal, nobody
seems to recognise that historically as
well as existeinially the concept of the
person is indissolubly bound up with
theology.... The person both as a
concept and as a living reality is purely
the product of patristic thought.
Without this, the deepest meaning or
personhood can neither be grasped nor
justified.'
He is not alone iu holding this opinion.
-
There are, certainly, difl'erences between
Christian theological and psychological ap-
proaches to the self, foremost of which is the
theological attestation that true personal
wholeness can be attained only through ''sal-
vation. ' The doctrine of imago Dei seems to
have crucially important implications for this
concept. Since humankind is created iu the
image of the triune God, in whoin inheres a
perfect unity of Persons, overcoming es-
trangement from God through salvation and
thereby becoming a member of the kingdom
ofGod would seem to entail the essential imity
of the person. Secular psychology, at first
glance, does not seem to hold the goal of self-
unity in such high esteem. However, it is
possible, I believe, to delineate certain simi-
larities in their respective approaches to
personhood and the assuined multiplicity of
the self that underlies it. There may be, there-
fore, considerably more common ground than
many are prepared to acknowledge.
Here at the beginning, 1 wish to clarify
the typology that I will employ throughout this
essay, since the tenns "person." "self." and
"identity." have become somewhat confused
in recent times." "Person" is the most over-
arching of these terms, and denotes the sum
total of the component parts of any human
individual, including the physical body, the
mind, the sense of self and identity.^ "Self."
to adopt Rom Harre's definition, will "...do
duty for the many aspects of personal being
that appear in personal and private regard.'"''
"Identity" will here be taken to refer to those
public and private aspects of the way an indi-
vidual person conceives him- or herself and
is conceived, in relation to other persons and
the physical world.^
Below, 1 shall contrast social cognitive
psychological theories of huinan individual-
ity with those contemporary theological ap-
proaches that are grounded in the doctrine of
imago Dei. \ will first establish that both dis-
ciplines conceive persons to be physically
embodied individuals-in-relation, in which
multiple senses of self inhere.* 1 will then
argue that both disciplines identify
personhood with a dynamic process of self-
unification, and, thus, they exhibit a degree
of similarity in their respective solutions to
the paradox of the self.
The Disunity of the Self in Psychology
and Theology
It is a fundamental tenet of much of con-
temporary psychology that a multiplicity of
self underlies the individual person. In mod-
em psychology this idea first arises in the
work of W'llliam James, who divided the con-
cept of the whole self into "I-component" (the
"pure ego") and "me-compouent" (the "em-
pirical self'').'^ .fames further subdivided the
"empirical self into three constituent parts,
which he claimed were organised hierarchi-
cally—the spiritual self at the top, the (plu-
ral) social self in the middle, and the material
or bodily self at the bottom.'" James also be-
lieved that the "I" of the self represented the
"active agent." able to shape its own destiny,
and is. therefore, better conceived as a pro-
cess, or verb, than as an entity. This contrasts
with the empirical self, portrayed as the sub-
jective interpretations of the individual's ex-
periences.
For James, multiplicity and perceived so-
cial self-evaluation go hand in hand, hence his
famous observation that a person could be
considered to have "...as many social selves
as there are individuals who recognise him and
carry an image of him in their mind." " This
idea was elaborated upon in the theories of
the symbolic interactionists, Charles Cooley
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and George Herbert Mead, and continues to
fomi the basis of the vast majority of con-
temporary social psychological models of the
self.'- According to these theorists, the self is
better described as a multiplicity, developed
through the subjective interpretation of the
reactions of others in a social context, and
continually reconstructed on the basis of new
social experience.'^
There are, certainly, differences between
Christian theological andpsychological
approaches to the self foremost of
which is the theological attestation that
true personal wholeness can be attained
only through ^^salvation.
An "I/me" distinction remains prevalent
in contemporary writings, though James's
concepts of the pure ego and empirical self
have not weathered as well. The "T" of mod-
em psychology, which refers to the "self-as-
knower." or the "experiencing subject." is
contrasted with the "me," meaning self-as-
known, or the object of experience: and the
two are usually portrayed as co-existent and
co-determining. "* As George Herbert Mead
obser\'ed, "If the 'T' speaks, the "me" hears.
If the "I" strikes, the "me" feels the blow." '^
In the last fifty years, cognitive psychol-
ogy, which has its theoretical foundations in,
and draws its conceptual inspiration from, a
computer metaphor for mind, has initiated a
new era in research on self. Social psycholo-
gist H. R. Markus has argued that the self is
more accurately described as a collection of
interrelated "self-schemata," each of which or-
ganizes and encodes specific information re-
garding perceived personal knowledge or in-
terpersonal relationships. Schemata are,
roughly speaking, structured clusters of con-
cepts relating to one's knowledge of stereo-
typical simations; they are well-established
entities in cognitive psychology. According
to this model, multiple conceptions of self
exist, not all of which are available at any one
time. Markus prefers to emphasize "work-
ing," "on-line," or "accessible" self-concepts,
whereby the self is a dynamic and pluralistic
strucmre that remains continually active and
in perpetual flux.
Each of these theories of self is compat-
ible with the conceptual typology outlined
above. So. how well do these secular psy-
chological approaches to the
human subject correspond
to those of contemporary
Christian theology? Cer-
tainly, there is an ancient
Christian theological tradi-
tion of conceiving the per-
son as a multifaceted entity.
Augustine's theology of the
soul, for example, presents
several different ways in
which this might be ex-
pressed. Each person, he alleges, is consti-
tuted by matter and spirit, characterized by
both "outer" and "inner" aspects: and each
soul is constimted by many different levels
of being, each "struggling" for dominance
over the others.'^ In each case, the multiplic-
ity of the person is appealed to in order to
explain the continuit>' of humankind with the
rest of creation, but also to distinguish it and
to explain its unique standing in relation to
God. Such prominent philosophers and theo-
logians as S0ren Kierkegaard. Emmanuel
Levinas, Paul Ricoeur. and Paul Tillich have
each, at some point, discussed the finite frag-
mented existence of the person in relation to
the infinite unity of God. Disunity, it seems,
is everywhere.
However, perhaps the most fruitful strand
of contemporary theological thought to ac-
knowledge the various multiple facets of the
self can be identified in discussions of the
iniago Dei, and it is primarily tliis body of
theories that I shall contrast with contempo-
rary psychological thinking about the person.
Clearly, the interrelationships of the three
Persons of the Trinity and the implications of
this for the imago Dei have frequently been
addressed in attempts to understand human
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persons. Sometimes, it has been assumed that
humanity as a whole bears the image of the
"social" Trinit}' (for example, in the work of
Jiirgen Moltmann), but many have attempted
to understand the imago Dei in as much as it
relates to the single, autonomous, multifac-
eted individual. I wish to focus on here on
this latter perspective. Protestant theologian
Alasdair McFadyen's book. Christian Theory
of the Indivichuil in Social Relationships, is
exemplary of such an approach, though many
have contributed to this general enteiprise.'"
Beginning with the presupposition that.
"Individuality. Personhood and selfhood do
not... refer to some internal and independent
source of identity, but to the way one is and
has been in relation," McFadyen argues:
[HJunian being is determined by the
relational foiTn proper to it. which may
be materially defined as being-in-
gratitude. This in turn implies that the
relational structure of human being is
one of openness to and for Gods
Word.'«
McFadyen's puq)ose here is to establish the
dialogical nature of the divine-human relation-
ship and the response of the person to God as
a "free-dialogue partner" in the context of this
relationship.
[T]he divine image, and the freedom
associated with it, are not qualities or
attributes which we can possess in
ourselves; rather, they designate a way
of being in relation. ''^
Conceiving the nature of God as Trinity,
McFadyen proposes an analogous theoiy of
individual being. He argues that the model
of the Trinity as a unique community of Per-
sons does not entail the autonomous individu-
ality of each Person, nor an understanding of
each Person as a specific mode of relation to
the other Persons of the Trinity. Instead, he
proposes that the Trinity subsists as "Persons
in relation and Persons only through relation.
Persons exist only as they exist for others, not
merely as they exist in and for themselves." ^^
This perspective is reflected in his understand-
ing of human persons as acquiring identity
through their relations with others. Persons
are individuals constructed through their in-
terpersonal relations with each other and with
God. He supposes that at any given moment
a person can be located at a spatio-temporal
point in a grid or network comprising the re-
lationships that are central to his or her social
world. At any particular time. then, the loca-
tion of the person is detenninative of the iden-
tity of that person at that time. Changing lo-
cation entails changing identity:
To enter a particular communication at
a particular point in a given exchange is
to make an implicit claim concerning
the social validity of such a contribu-
tion.... The social space and time it is
appropriate for "me" to occupy in each
case is different.-'
Although some elements of this theory are
similar to some of those secular psychologi-
cal theories discussed above, the grounding
of McFadyen's theory' in the imago Dei leads
to a distinctive difference— the core themes
of relationality and multifaceted identity,
which McFadyen believes define the person,
are grounded in the image of God as it in-
heres in the human. Where psychology sees
a two-way. mutually detennining relationship
between an individual and the others of soci-
ety. McFadyen's theological anthropology
sees a triune relationship between individu-
als, society, and God.
Even from this brief overview, then,
emerges a general consensus between some
contemporary secular psychologists and
Christian theologians that physically embod-
ied persons have multiple senses of self,
which are formed largely through their ex-
perience of interpersonal interaction. How-
ever, I now wish to show that neither secu-
lar psychology nor Christian theology nec-
essaiily dismisses the idea of a substantive,
enduiing component to the individual. Far
frotn it. Rather, the multiplicity of selves
can be ascribed specific content in as much
as it can be represented as real knowledge
about the person, even if this knowledge is
derived and distilled from social encoun-
ters— in which case, personhood itself is best
conceived, perhaps, as something substan-
tive beings do. rather than as a fixed un-
changing state of being. From this perspec-
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live, the substantive individual cannot be
separated from his or her beiug-in-relation.
This is. as will be seen, a widely endorsed
principle.
"
Personhood as the Unification of Self:
Identity in Psychology
Returning for a moment to Haire's con-
cept of self, he writes:
The self as an expression of the
singularity of the pomt of view of the
embodied person in perception, the
unity and structured pattern of the
contents of consciousness, is always
singular for every human being, in all
cultures. I f there are exceptions they
are in the realm of myth and mysti-
cism.-''
By this, he means that every person uses the
personal pronoun "I" in such a way that indi-
vidual people can somehow claim their expe-
riences for themselves and index them as
events in their own personal history. How.
exactly, should this assertion be squared with
the tacit acknowledgement that the self is ul-
timately a plurality? I shall argue here, that
this depends on pre- -
cisely how self-unity is
conceived.
There is no singular
universally agreed
upon conception of
self-unity.^'' One of the
best-established ap-
proaches to this prob-
lem, however, and ar-
guably the most suc-
cessful, is to adopt a
phenomenological ap-
proach to self-unity, as psychologist and phi-
losopher Dan McAdams does, and seek to un-
derstand it through the description of how one
derives one's sense of self.^ Several types of
theory have been proposed in this mold.
Some, notably the cogitive psychologist
Seymour Epstein, propose that the self is
analogous to an hypothetico-deductive theory
of how one relates to the world, and that the
unification of the self is promoted by one's
natural drive toward internal consistency.-''
Others suppose that a person's various selves
are structurally interconnected so as to form
a loosely integrated whole, giving the illusion
of unity, but continuing to exist as a multi-
plicity, each retaining the capacity for a de-
gree of autonomous functioning. This, in
Marvin Minsky's terms, is the "society of
mind." -^ It is similar to the preferred ap-
proaches of psychologists Seymour
Rosenberg and Francisco Varela.^
There is, however, a connnon denomi-
nator to almost all accounts of self-unity:
unity is not a static /^ro/^mv of the self: rather
there is a dynamic process of self-organiza-
tion at work.-'' Considering self-unity in dy-
namic terms, rather than as an attribute of a
superordinate entity, also offers an extremely
congenial theory of personal individuality
and uniqueness, which avoids the problems
of absolute relativism. Individuality, from
this perspective, subsists in the unique orga-
nizational pattern of a person's multiple
selves. McAdams's approach is possibly the
best developed, most systematic theory of
this kind.-^''
Sometimes^ it has been assumed that
humanity as a whole bears the image
of the '^sociaV* Trinity^ but many have
attempted to understand the imago
Dei in as much as it relates to the
single^ autonomous, multifaceted
individual
McAdams discusses the "T-self," in pro-
cess terms as "selfing." Remaining faithful
to the Jamesian concept of the T' as the "pro-
cess of being a self," McAdams defines the
verb "to self:
To self—or to maintain the "stance'" of
an "I"' in the world— is to apprehend
and appropriate experience as a
subject, to grasp phenomenal experi-
ence as one's own, as belonging "to
me."^'
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Central to this concept of the "I-seLF' is that
the process of experiencing one's material
and social world changes the "me" in some
way. which, in turn, exerts a significant in-
fluence on how one's material and social
world is experienced. In James's terms, "the
T reflexively creates a modem 'me' for
which the T assumes authorsliip and respon-
sibility." ^- McAdams explains"
|T|he "me" is a motley collection of
self-attributions. . . . For many adults in
contemporar>' modem societies, unity in
the "me"" is rather a cultural expectation
that arises when one seeks to move
from a self-list [such as myself as a
father, myself as a friend, etc.]. . .to a
more patterned and purposeful
integration of the "me." '"^
This purposeful integration, he argues, takes
the form of the construction of a narrative to
one's life story. Unit>' in the ' me', then, is also
the constmction of identity.
Such a narrative synthesizes the
synchronic and diachronic elements of the
"me"" into a coherent unified whole, so that
one's experience of "me'"in the past leads to
the "me" of the present, which in turn sets the
stage for the "me" of the future.^ A great
many theorists are in complete agreement with
McAdams. that this is indeed how one's life
is given unity and purpose.^^ Importantly, it
is a continuous process, which never culmi-
nates in the "birth" of a person. Rather,
personhood is a perpetually evolving process
of becoming. Theologian Emmanuel Levinas
remarks:
The "I" is not a being that always
remains the same, but is the being
whose existence consists in identifying
itself, in recovering its identity
throughout all that happens to it. It is
the primal identity, the primordial work
of identification.^*'
It seems that even if a person's multiple
selves are not necessarily unified in any
sense other than the purely phenomenologi-
cal, this is in itself enough to endow a sense
of unique individualit>' and continuity.^^ The
process of self-unification is the process of
becoming a person. It is the process of or-
ganizing experience into a unique pattern —
an autobiography, or the narrative of an in-
dividual life story. It is essentially the con-
struction of identity.-'^
Personhood as Becoming a Being
in Relation: Theological Concepts
of Individuaiity
I now turn to examine the potential simi-
larities between secular psychological notions
of self- unification and a specific concept of
personhood that has developed within Chris-
tian theology. 1 argue that personhood can
also be portrayed, from a theological perspec-
tive, as a process that involves both unifying
the multifaceted senses of self and maintain-
ing a degree of consistency. However, these
senses of self are ultimately grounded in a
faith relationship with God.
Continuity and stability', as McFadyen and
Vemon Wliite use the ternis. have their equiva-
lent in the concept of wholeness, or singular-
ity, which Hane and others identify as a de-
finitive characteristic of the human person.
Protestant theologian Woffhart Pannenberg
argues:
The wholeness of the self, which
infinitely transcends the limitations of
life at any given moment, finds its
present manifestation as personality.
"Person"' signifies the human being in
its wholeness, which transcends the
fragmentariness of its reality-at-hand.''^
Persons, he presumes, are more than just col-
lections of fragments; they are characterized
by a imified and continuous experience.'^'' In
fact, theological expressions of the importance
of personal wholeness are not difficult to
fmd.^'
Theologically, the unity or continuity of
the self has exceedingly important implica-
tions (in contrast to secular psychological
theories), both with respect to personal ontol-
ogy and to personal responsibility. Given the
essential unity of the persons of the Tiinity,
to be created in the image of God means to be
created as a whole, unified person, not as a
multiplicity of distinct selves. Without an es-
sential continuity of identity, moreover, how
could an individual be strictly said to be in
relation to God at all, since within the one
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body, mauy iudepeudent relationships would
be established. As Anglican theologian
Vernon WTiite simply observes, "The origi-
nality and uniqueness of each individual is a
presupposition of Christian belief of our
createdness. and of prophetic ministry." ''-
The projects of Wliiie. Colin Gunton. and
John Zizioulas to ground the individuality of
human persons in a systematic theological
ontology is also, in many ways, an attempt to
defend the imity of the person, and thereby
establish the continuity of identity. They wish
to establish the existence of a substantive com-
ponent to human persons— a consistency that
underpins the many identities brought into
being through the continuous flux of
relationality that is implied by imderstanding
persons as beings-in-
relation. Without tliis
continuity, they argue
,
"the self is always
likely to be. ..un-
stable, transient, di-
minished.""'^
White criticizes
philosophical theolo-
gian John Millbank
for the kind of ex- j|
treme relativism that he and McFadyen strive
to avoid. Millbank argues:
Just as God... is not a "substance,"
because he is nothing fundamental
underlying anytliing else, so also there
are no substances in creation, no
underlying matter, and no discrete and
inviolable "things".... There are no
things, no substances, only shifting
relations.**
What is attractive in this account is its descrip-
tion of the dynamism of personhood. Accord-
ing to Millbank, personhood is the constant
flux of relationality, not just a fixed state of
being. For White, Millbank takes a step too
far, as this concept of personhood removes
any possibility of conceiving persons as "en-
during particulars" or of establishing a conti-
nuity in personal identity. For both White and
McFadyen. persons "are a manifestation of
their relations, foniied through though not
simply reducible to them."'*^
McFadyen. also wary of the Millbankian
extremes of relativism, offers a defense of this
idea of "relational but particular jxirsonhood."
He argues:
The "I" which responds in the flux of
unfolding situations and relationships
includes a "sedimentation" of previous
such moments of response which
together form a unique and stable
cluster within the structure of the
developing personal identity.*'
Personal identities are somehow "sedimcnted"
from personal experiences of social relations
and are. therefore, bound to the identities of
others and one's relations with them. Part of
being in relation, then, is the construction of
idcurity — a product of the "I" acting to unify
the "me."
Where psychology sees a two-way, mutu-
ally determining relationship between an
individual and the others ofsociety,
McFadyen^s theological anthropology
sees a triune relationship between indi-
viduals, society, and God,
McFadyen posits the existence of what he
refers to as, a "deep-self," which is not sub-
ject to the same degree of changeability that
a person's other multiple identities are sus-
ceptible to. The deep-self is seen as a core
aspect of identity, which is derived from the
sedimentation of the experience of a particu-
larly close relationship, and which is always
present in the background of one's relations
with less significant others. Unlike other iden-
tities, it is not situation specific. Effectively,
it acts as a mediating presence in less stable
relations, offering continuity when the sense
of self is in danger of being fragmented.
Borrowing Tillich's terminology,
McFadyen argues that persons, through the
meaningful social expression of themselves,
come to "center" themselves. His concept of
"centering" is very closely analogous to the
organizational processes that many secular
psychological theories have described and
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leads to the person experiencing him- or her-
self as directing coiimiunicalion from a con-
tinuous point of identity. Hence, persons,
through the recognition and understanding of
the fact that they are unique socially interac-
tive individuals, are able to fomi an experi-
entially transcendent sense of self, which "en-
ables one's experience and activity in diverse
places and times to be unified in a central
organisational stmcture which transcends the
embodiment in any and all particular con-
texts." "^^ It is in this way. according to
McFadyen, that the individual achieves unity
and continuity.
So. it appears that a number of theologians
are happy to posit the existence of a stable
sense of self, which is the product of prior
experience, and exists over and above the re-
lational aspects from which the individual per-
son is formed. Thus, it is possible to discern
a notion of personhood that is. in many ways,
similar to the process of narratization that
secular psychologists have described. A theo-
logical approach to the self is not incompat-
ible with the idea that a person's identity ex-
ists primarily in a dialogical relation with the
other of any individual relation and is, thus,
specific to that relation: but for many theolo-
gians, as for many psychologists, the experi-
ence of self has a transcendent quality.
Personhood involves the continuous "updat-
ing" of the person in the light of new experi-
ence; and. thus, the self must be conceived in
dynamic terms. In other words, personhood
is a process of becoming, a process of unifi-
cation through which continuity is established,
which both emerges from and is inseparable
from the organized substantive center of per-
sonal experience.
In summary. I quote McFadyen once
more:
The "self should not be conceived of
as an organ, but in terms of the
organization which believing in it
enables. For it is not something one has
but something one is and does, a way of
being in public and private. It is not a
substance but a means of organizing
ones experience, thought, knowledge,
beliefs, action, etc., as though centered
on a substantial imier core."*
Conclusions
My primar)' aim throughout has been to
establish certain points of contact between
theological and psychological approaches to
the problem of how the self comes to be uni-
fied in the human person. I have argued that
secular psychological and some Christian
theological theories are in broad agreement
regarding the essential multiplicity of selves
that underlie the person. Personhood, it is
clear, is not conceived by either discipline to
be a static state, and the disciplines are united
in their supposition that the perceived singu-
larity of the human person is an ongoing dy-
namic process of becoming.
Some differences have also been identi-
fied here, the most striking of which concerns
the idea of personal relationalit>'. Christian
theologians, in contrast to secular psycholo-
gists, though they too recognize the impor-
tance of other human relationships, are spe-
cifically concerned to ground the process of
becoming and the construction of identity in
the notion of being-in-relation to God— as
answering God's call. A further difference lies
in the value ascribed to the continuity and
unity of the person. No a priori reason exists
for why the multiple selves of the person
should be unified. The theories of Varela,
Minsk-y and Rosenberg are examples of theo-
ries that are perfectly at ease with the idea
that a persons selves ultimately remain dis-
united in anything but the most perfunctory
of ways— that is. through their being parts of
a single individual person. Christian theol-
ogy, by contrast, emphasises the importance
of the unity of the person as an essential as-
pect of being created in the image of, and
standing in relation to, God.
Although the two disciplines have not
been shown to be in complete agreement, this
was neither an objective nor an aspiration. I
have merely tried to show that in as much as
they both address the multiplicity and unity
of the self as deep and enduring problems,
they can ask similar questions and make simi-
lar theoretical distinctions. Too frequently,
theology and the human sciences are supposed
to offer competing, rather than complemen-
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tar>', explauatious of the self: bliudly placing
them iu such opposition precludes the mutual
elucidation that might arise from a close analy-
sis of their subtle differences, as well as their
similarities.
Pannenberg notes:
The idea of wholeness cannot be
claimed as tlie special preserve of
theology, although theology may insist
that human beings can attain their
wholeness only in the form of "salva-
tion" that is promised and given by
God, and not through any effort at self-
realization."*'
The concept of attaining wholeness through
salvation is indeed central to Christian theol-
ogy, but it would be a mistake to presume that
the idea of multiplicity is the special preserve
of psychology.
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Endnotes:
1. Zizioulas. Being as Communion, p. 27.
Italics in the origiual.
2. See Schwobel.
3. Pannenberg, pp. 234-35.
4. Whatever ones opinion regarding the
compatibility of theological and psychologi-
cal approaches to the person, it is certain that
the general incoherence of the topic is a prob-
lem for both disciplines. As Rom Harre notes.
'The study of no aspect of humanity is so
marked by muddled thinking and confusion
of thought as this one" (p. 2). In sympathy
with this perspective. Pfuetze proclaimed,
"The problem of the self is perhaps the most
elusive, abstruse, and subtle problem in phi-
losophy. We know, or think we know, so much
about man, about human nature - and yet we
know so little. The terms wc employ are
names to cover our ignorance; they are ab-
stracted descriptions which never give us the
concrete wholeness of human lives nor ex-
plain the rich complexity of human experi-
ence" (p. 23).
5. Harre uses "person" to refer to "a human
being as a social and psychological being, as
a human organism having a sense of its place
among others of its kind, a sense of its own
history and beliefs about at least some of its
attributes" (p. 73).
6. Harre. p. 73. Harre actually distinguishes
between three specific intenelated descrip-
tions of self, none of which, he argues, is in-
dividually adequate: all inhere in the person.
Self, he supposes, can be described as a sin-
gular point of view, as the totality of personal
attributes, or as how the individual appears to
others.
7. One important caveat, though, must be
firmly made at this point: the definitions of-
fered above must be seen as specific to the
Christian West, in the latter half of the twen-
tieth century. Concepts of person have
changed much over time: and those features
of the person that are taken for granted in the
modem western world, such as the extent to
which they are attributed individuality or per-
ceived to be personally autonomous, are not
always so self-evident in pre-modem thought
or in non-Western cultures. Although 1 am
primarily concerned here with certain con-
trasts between contemporary Christian theo-
logical and psychological anthropologies, I
am aware that those concepts are not neces-
sarily representative of the whole gamut of
person research.
8. 1 should emphasise that, as Lamiell notes,
the concept of personal individuality is not
necessarily derived from the philosophical
doctrine of individualism. Indeed, many of
the aspects of personhood that will be dis-
cussed here are essentially relationally de-
rived. They are acquired and developed
though participation in interpersonal relation-
ships, and through the interactions with the
physical world, which are a crucial part of
human existence. A sense of individuality —
roughly coirelated with a person's impression
of his- or herself as perceiving the world from
a unique and singular point of view — is argu-
ably a common denominator of all human
persons in all cultures.
9. James is usually credited with introduc-
ing the self and identity as a subject of scien-
tific analysis, as he was the first to suppose
that it could be subject to the systematic rig-
orous empirical research procedures that, un-
til then, were the preser\'e of the more tradi-
tional natural sciences. He developed the idea
of a multiphcity of selves, though the appar-
ent disunity of the self. soul, or person is not
an original contemporary psychological dis-
covery. Rather, it is an idea that is finnly
grounded in many centuries of philosophical
and theological tradition.
10. This hierarchy reflects his view that the
material body is the foundation for all other
selves and that the spiritual selfis the apex of
a person's individuality, comprising his or her
"thoughts, dispositions, moral judgements,
and so on, which he considered to be the more
enduring aspects of the self (Haner. p. 2).
1 1
.
James. Principles ofPsychology, p. 294.
12. Furthermore, advances in empirical
methodology, including more precise data-
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gathering procedures and more sophisticated
data-analytic methods, have reinvigorated the
scientific study of the self, and reseaich in this
area has mushroomed in recent years. See.
for example, Higgins; Hermans and Kempen:
Bracken; Rosenberg.
1 .3. The theory of the social construction of
the self finds its most straightforward expres-
sion in Cooley's famous concept of the ''look-
ing-glass self'— the idea that one comes to
know oneself only by assiinilatiug the reac-
tions of others toward oneself into a self-im-
age.
14. Behayiorists and others have attempted
to deny the efficacy of the "me." and many
have quibbled over the precise mode of func-
tioning of the "I."
15. Mead. p. 143.
16. According to Augustine of Hippo, the
soul of the irrational outer man comprised the
vegetative soul— the basic life giving prin-
ciple common to man, animals and plants
alike - and the animal soul, which includes
those aspects of being common to man and
animals such as sense perception. Augustine
further divided the rational soul of inner man
into the intellect and the will, which together
comprised five further grades of being rising
from discursive reason all the way to the in-
tellectual contemplation of God. See de
Trinitate XII.21-25. XIV. 1-5.
17. See. for example. Zizioulas, Being as
Communion, and "On Being a Person: To-
wards an Ontology of Personhood." See also
Gunton and Schwobel; and White.
18. McFadyen, p. 22.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 27.
21. Ibid., p. 83.
22. See Bracken; Ashmore and Jussim; and
Fletcher and Fitness.
23. Harre. p. 8.
24. Intuitively, from a folk-psychological
perspective, self- unity is supposed to be con-
ferred by a superordinate structure of the self
- a substantive T that organizes "me" — or
through the continuity of consciousness in the
manner proposed by John Locke and subse-
quently William James. These are now deeply
unpopular approaches to the idea of unity,
which raises as many questions as they an-
swer, given how poorly consciousness is ac-
tually understood.
25. See McAdams.
26. See Epstein.
27. Although the mind remains eifectively
a society. Minsky argues, the concept of a self
retains its utility, "provided that we think of it
not as a centralized and all-powerful entity,
but as a society of ideas that include both our
images of what the mind is and our ideals
about what it ought to be" (p. 23).
28. Rosenberg: Varela; and Minsky. This is
not exactly a theory of unity, but more of a
theory of how multiple selves might act as a
sort of conglomerate entity, each retaining a
degree of autonomy while recognizing the
important roles that the other selves have to
play in "wholeness" at a personal level. In
fact, there is no compelling psychological rea-
son for why the self should be unified at all.
This, it will be argued below, represents an-
other fundamental point of departure from
theological conceptions of the person.
29. McAdams continues to trace this con-
cept of a unifying process through much of
psychoanalytic and cognitive psychology
from Goldstein and Maslow to Jung and
Piaget. See McAdams, p. 57.
30. McAdams. 1997.
31. McAdams. p. 56.
32. Ibid., p. 61.
33. Ibid., p. 60.
34. That one's prior experience has a sig-
nificant influence on one's present experi-
ence— the "T" —needs nojustification: it is the
premise upon which the whole of psychology
is predicated.
35. Including Polkinghome; Maclntyre; and
Hermans and Kempen.
36. Levinas, p. 36.
37. In fact. some, such as Varela. see no
compelling psychological reason for why the
self should be unified at all.
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38. As Proudfooi suggests with character-
istic clarity, "The issue can be stated quite sim-
ply. I am a sou. husband lover, friend, com-
petitor, citizen, colleague, and teacher. Each
of these identities, which operate on different
levels, contributes to my sense of myself.
Sometimes they complement one another and
at other times they conflict.... In every mo-
ment I forge an identity that integrates or pulls
together all of these different roles into a sense
of myself as a person. I think. 1 act. other
persons respond to me, and I respond to their
responses" (p. 21).
39. Pannenberg. p. 235.
40. McAdams makes the interesting point
that fragmentation'" is a word that is not
popular among psychologists. Whereas Mead
and others were keen to celebrate the multi-
plicity of the self, 'fragmentation" carries
overtones of postmodern angst and uncer-
tainty (McAdams, p. 53). When theologians
use the word fragmentation to refer either to
the psychology of the person or the place of
the individual in coimnunity (for example, in
the manner of WTiite or Pannenberg). a simi-
larly negative state of affairs is usually being
implied. In these contexts, it is a word most
often associated with "'brokenness," "immo-
rality," "conflicting." or "failure." This is. in
turn, testament to the intrinsic value that theo-
logians tend to place upon self-unity.
41. As Tillich argues, "selfhood or self-
centereduess must be attributed in some mea-
sure to all living beings.... Man is a fully
developed and completely centered self. He
possesses' himself in the form of self-con-
sciousness. He has an ego-self (vol. 1, pp.
169-70).
42. White, p. 87.
43. Ibid., p. 95.
44. Millbank. pp. 424, 426; While, p. 98.
45. McFadyen continues, "The persons of
the Trinity, for example, are identified by
tenns which indicate their most significant re-
lations. Yet they appear in many more rela-
tions in a formally identical but materially
different way. Hence the Father is identified
principally in terms of the relation with the
Son but has other relations less significant for,
but consistent with. His relational identity and
being" (p.40). John Zizioulas and Colin
Gunton are of the same opinion and have simi-
larly tried to argue that the concepts of sub-
stantial particularity and relationality can co-
exist in a concept of persons.
46. White, p. 104.
47. McFadyen. p. 100.
48. Ibid., p. 98
49. Pannenberg. pp. 234-35.
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